If you go through the article on Eliminative Materialism you should note that the whole, large academic ideology of EM rests on a promissory note of materialism which is of rather dubious reliability.
Eliminative materialists claim that an ontologically radical theory change of this sort awaits the theoretical posits of folk psychology. Just as we came to understand that there are no such things as demons (because nothing at all like demons appear in modern accounts of strange behavior), so too, eliminative materialists argue that various folk psychological concepts—like our concept of belief—will eventually be recognized as empty posits that fail to correspond with anything that actually exists. Since there is nothing that has the causal and semantic properties we attribute to beliefs (and many other mental states) it will turn out that there really are no such things.
A somewhat similar framework for understanding eliminative materialism is provided by David Lewis's discussion of functional definitions in psychology (1972) (see the entry on functionalism). In Lewis's account, our commonsense mental notions can be treated as functionally defined theoretical terms that appear in a chain of Ramsey-sentences. The Ramsey-sentences are a formal reconstruction of the platitudes of commonsense psychology. They provide a set of roles or conditions that more or less must be met for the instantiation of any given state. If nothing comes close to actually filling the roles specified by this framework for a certain state, then we are warranted in saying that the theoretical posit in question doesn't refer and there is no such thing. Eliminative materialists claim that this is precisely what will happen with at least some of our folk mental notions.
I'll point out two things in that.
. . . eliminative materialists argue that various folk psychological concepts—like our concept of belief—will eventually be recognized as empty posits that fail to correspond with anything that actually exists
They can argue that all they want but until that eventuality is reached, there is no reason to believe their fondest wish will be consummated. There are reasons to doubt the validity of it on many levels, NOT LEAST OF WHICH IS THAT THIS FUTURE EVENTUALITY IS A FOND BELIEF OF THESE MATERIALISTS. It is a particular kind of question begging in which the entire thing depends on the conclusion being not only contained in the premises, it is the whole reason for the whole thing and the only reason for any of it to be declared to work. The whole thing is peddling a pig in a poke in which there doesn't seem to be anything in the bag and the bag may well never, I'll assert will never, ever be opened. You even have to believe that the bag will be opened at some unspecifiable future for it to work.
It is astounding the extent to which, eliminative materialism as a philosophical exercise depends on debunking belief when it is riddled with beliefs, not only beliefs but fondest wishes. It is made of beliefs and wishes.
To go on:
If nothing comes close to actually filling the roles specified by this framework for a certain state, then we are warranted in saying that the theoretical posit in question doesn't refer and there is no such thing.
That seems to me to be an extension of the old positivist trick of, on the basis of ideological declarations, trying to declare things they don't like to be "meaningless" even in those cases when everyone - including the materialists - knows the meaning of what they don't like and declare, by fiat, to be meaningless.
It, as well, is a sort of negative promissory note, a hedged bet against the market of ideas in which the materialists' desire is based on nothing coming "close to actually fulfilling the role specified by this framework" when everything about it, including the insisted on framing, is not even of known relevance to the problem.
It, as well, is dependent on a guaranteed future which is in no way guaranteed and about which there is ample grounds for skepticism. Only in this case, if you want to bet on eliminative materialism, you buy yourself a whole host of other consequences which are of value only to those who buy into the ideology before the entire thing starts. Not least of which is that it debunks all intellectual behavior, including the one you engage in as an eleminative materialist. The only thing anyone needs to do to defeat their argument is to say that you don't buy into any of their starting premises.
Update: Believing beliefs are invalid is a belief. Believing that beliefs don't exist is a belief. Believing any of the parts of their arguments requires there to be beliefs. Believing in the validity of the structure of arguments as a means of finding meaning or, yes, truth, is a belief. I wonder if there has ever been a more absurd series of statements made within academic philosophy than those resorted to by materialists of this kind which are more obviously invalid due to their double-talking foundation.
This, friends, is the very substance of the rankest of academic decadence.
This is a variation on the argument "God doesn't exist because you can't prove it." Of course, no proof offered will be accepted, so the assertion is "proven." I read this and thought,"So, all emotional states are false and will fall away in the light if this pure reason?"
ReplyDeleteSure, that'll happen.
Dime store Buddhism, with no clue about true Buddhism. This is the fly in the bottle Wittgenstein was on about.
I should have added that the promissory note of materialism also implicitly guarantees that this future, unspecified, "ontologically radical theory change" is guaranteed to be the last word on the topic instead of just a stopping point before it, itself, is subject to an as unspecified future ontologically radical theory change. That's one of the problems with basing your philosophical stand on such promissory notes, there is no guarantee that it will be the end of it. Without that being true, they are standing on b-movie quicksand. You can pretend anything about a future which hasn't arrived yet. And yet they snark about "folklore" and beliefs.
DeleteAnd "belief"is, of course, defined as "what you know ain't so," or at least what cannot be "proved" in very narrow confines, confines that exclude most if human existence. I cannot prove I love my wife, so there is no such "thing"as love (love is a thing?).
ReplyDeleteRussell and Whitehead were smarter than this, and they were wrong, too.
I think a huge swath of 20th century English language (and other) philosophy will be seen as incredibly decadent in the future. Assuming there is a future. Anyone who reads that stuff and reads much of medieval philosophy without any materialistic bias would have to conclude that the "dark ages" were full of light by comparison.
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