So, after a year of asking, atheists, materialists can't tell us how the brain could possibly know that it needed to make an idea about something, what the structure to make to be that idea in the brain would be and how to know it had made the right structure without that ideal already being present in the brain to tell it those things. I'M NOT THE ONE COMING UP WITH A MATERIALIST MODEL OF THE MIND THAT CAN'T ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS RENDERED INSOLUBLE DUE TO ITS IDEOLOGICAL CLAIMS OF WHAT THE MIND IS.
Dealing with Stephen Hawking's statement, really a demand that he and other like minded cosmologists be exempted from having their pet ideas being verified in the physical universe, that they get to be called "science" just because it was they who came up with them forces many other question. Apparently their brains are, now, exempted from any form of testing, any need to collect information, even any eventual verification that their invented universes even cohere in order for what they want to publish and pontificate about to pass any level of intellectual verification.
That, to put it plainly, is crap that no one with a rational mind would consent to pretend or feel the slightest need to take seriously.
But the problem of insisting that minds, that the ideas that minds contain are the merely incidental product of physical structures in the physical brain are far more fundamental to any claim of universal validity of any academic thought and, mostly clearly, for the status of those "laws of nature" that materialists and atheists are always gassing on about. If that is true for physical law as physical structure, they even have to impeach the nature of the mathematics that even Hawking wants to retain, just so he's got some medium through which to construct his sci-fi science. Mathematical proof would, also, have to be a mere product of physical structures in the brain-only brain.
How much leeway could there be in the actual physical structure dealing which is the "real" substrate of an idea before that idea dissolves into an amorphous solution of perhaps related but distinctly different physical entities?
That is a very real problem with the most widespread faith in such matters whether the proposed physical idea-structures are molecules, proteins, tissues or even the vaguely claimed equivalent to circuits in computers. My guess is that for something as supposedly specific as a physical law that the structure would have to be both very specific in its form and function, but that it would have to be very biologically potent in order for it to attain any kind of general application.
But, then, how can sufficient uniformity be maintained from one brain to another for the idea-structure to generate one specific idea shared among two, or millions of brains said to contain that physical law? I am guessing that even before you got down to the matter of random mutation on a molecular level that the variation among even a small sample of such brain-constructs would render the idea that such a materialist conception had a uniform character is vanishingly improbable. I wonder if, when pushed to its conclusions that the brain-only ideology doesn't impeach the very thing that it rests in, an assumption that there is any such thing as a uniform physical law that human minds have access to and can derive assumptions from, that within the very real social environment which science cannot exist without there could be no such thing as a uniform physical law or even a uniform proof of mathematics.
I am only beginning to think about this problem, I suspect that it's a far more difficult hurdle for materialist ideology to jump over without their entire ideological system collapsing. It's certainly not good for the claims of reliability of science. My guess is that if people took that problem very far the only hope for any kind of universal validity and applicability of math, science, etc. lies in a non-material mind.
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