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Tuesday, May 25, 2021

"this conception denied altogether any intrinsic power of thought and thus denied any grounds for claiming freedom of thought."

THIS NEW LOOK AT the introduction of the late Joseph Weizenbaum's 1975 book Computer Power and Human Reason  goes over material I went over in May 2013.  Some of the resources I would have liked to have then weren't available to me and, in terms of studying and thinking about the problems I dealt with then a lot or water has gone under the bridge.  I will comment on the same things Weizenbaum wrote but the comments will not be the same, in some ways they will be far more vehement in their rejection of the materialism that I was merely skeptical of as a social and intellectual influence then.  I have come to believe that it is one of if not the central component of the degeneracy of human culture and behavior.  I will be breaking into the text to point out and comment on points I see as even more important now than I did then. 

Introduction

In 1935 Michael Polanyi,  then holder of the Chair of Physical Chemistry at Victoria University of Manchester,  England, was suddenly shocked into a confrontation with philosophical questions that have ever since dominated his life.  The shock was administered by Nicolai Bukharin,  one of the leading theoreticians of the Russian Communist party,  who told Polanyi that "under socialism the conception of science pursued for its own sake would disappear, for the interests of scientists would spontaneously turn to the problems of the current Five Year Plan."  Polanyi sensed then that "the scientific outlook appeared to have produced a mechanical conception of man and history in which there was no place for science itself."  And further that "this conception denied altogether any intrinsic power of thought and thus denied any grounds for claiming freedom of thought."
 

It was gratifying to see that not only such brilliant thinkers as Michael Polanyi and Joseph Weizenbaum had seen something I've pointed out repeatedly, that a materialististic-scientistic ideological orientation is certainly inconsistent with taking any mental activity on the part of human beings as being of transcendent significance - certainly not in that extra-scientific activity of discerning truth - but in the actually more banal activity of doing science and having the results have any claim to being more than the product of the particular brain chemistry of the scientists doing it, which could only find truth on no more than on the odds of such chemistry being gathered by chance in any one locus, such as a scientist's brain affords.   I would guess that the chances against such a peculiar congregation of chemicals acting under the operation of human memory and judgement would tend to obscure the chances of finding truth at least by as much as they might help toward that goal but, certainly, the presence of such happy coincidences would add newer vectors into the equations and may tend to diminish the probability of truth than to enhance it.  It is ironic that such a materialist who would like to grant some power to human judgement would only be providing someone with the ability to point out they were resorting to arguments of intelligent design in the process of creation and diminishing the role of those gods of atheist contingency "probability" and "random chance" to a considerable degree. 

I would go a lot farther than I did then in attributing to that kind of thinking the general degeneration in a sense of the morality of telling the truth as opposed to telling lies.  I would, of course, have been radicalized by witnessing the subsequent experience of the United States and other countries falling into a "post-truth" mode of thought, noting that the example used by Weizenbaum, Nicolai Bukharin,  one of the leading theoreticians of the Russian Communist party, only indicates how much earlier the reign of a regime of lies followed from a self-intended scientific regime gaining power and reducing the product of science to a tool of the intentions of the Communist Party, something also done by other materialists in the same decade in Germany, though in that case the 19th century science followed was the Darwinist ideology of natural selection.  I would probably not have dared to make the connection between that view of science and the vulgar materialist's, Donald Trump's and his Republican goons' treatment of science.    

I don't know how much time Polanyi thought he would devote to developing an argument for a contrary concept of man and history.  His very shock testifies to the fact that he was in profound disagreement with Bukharin,  therefore that he already conceived of man differently,  even if he could not then give explicit form to his concept.  It may be that he determined to write a counterargument in Bukharin's position,  drawing only on his own experience as a scientist, and to have done with it in short order.  As it turned out,  however, the confrontation with philosophy triggered by Bukharin's revelation was to demand Polanyi's entire attention from then to the present day [c1975]

I recite this bit of history for two reasons.  The first is to illustrate that ideas which seem at first glance to be obvious and simple, and which ought therefore to be universally credible once they have been articulated,  are sometimes buoys marking out stormy channels in deep intellectual seas.  That science is creative, that the creative act in science is equivalent to the creative act in art, that creation springs only from autonomous individuals, as such a simple and, one might think, obvious idea.  Yet Polyani has, as have many others, spent nearly a lifetime exploring, the ground in which it is anchored and the turbulent sea of implications which surrounds it.

What both Polyani and Weizenbaum were confronting was far larger and deeper than that, it was one important but relatively small area in which the implications of materialism and scientism and the habits of thought that those ideologies have generated and which has become a tidal wave in human culture came back to bite science.  Weizenbaum correctly notes that science is a creative act, AN ACT OF CREATION, it is the creation of a human explanation - unfortunately, especially in the life sciences the creation of humanly convincing narratives - which are only as legitimate as, have only the right to be held as important as the minds that are creating them.   And both materialism and scientism as ideologies are corrosive of the belief that our minds are capable of producing that legitimacy and significance and importance.  The implications of that which are the most dangerous are those within large scale, organized human activities, government, business, industry, etc. in which governments and corporations, legal fictions invented by people to multiply human power and potency and in the ultimate in such loose organization, human societies and the human population as a whole.   Without the sense of morality - which materialism destroys and scientism inevitably corrodes - that allows us to hold that the truth is superior to lies, that rights are real and inherent to all people and animals, that the continuation of life on Earth is entirely more important than the profits of industry and the wealth of billionaires, the thing which Polanyi was so disturbed by comes to complete expression in all too real reality.
 

The second reason I recite this history is that I feel myself to be reliving part of it.  My own shock was administered not by any important political figures espousing his philosophy of science, but by some people who insisted on misinterpreting a piece of work I had done.  I write this without bitterness and certainly not in a defensive mood  Indeed, the interpretations I have in mind tended, if anything, to overrate what little I had accomplished and certainly its importance.  No, I recall that piece of work now only because it seems to me to provide the most parsimonious way of identifying the issues I mean to discuss.   

The work was done in the period 1964-1966, and was reported in the computer-science literature in January 1966 and August 1967.  To summarize it briefly,  I composed a computer program with which one could "converse" in English.  The human conversationalist partner would type his portion of the conversation on a typewriter connected to a computer, and the computer, under control of my program, would analyze the message that had so been transmitted to it,  compose a response to it in English, and cause the response to be typed on the computer's typewriter.


I chose the name ELIZA for the language analysis program because, like the Eliza of Pygmalion fame,  it could be taught to "speak" increasingly well.  Because the conversations must about something, that is, because they must take place within some context,  the program was constructed in a two-tiered arrangement, the first tier consisting of the language analyzer and the second of a script.  The script is a set of rules rather like those that might be given to an actor who is to use them to improvise around a certain theme.  Thus ELIZA could be given a script to enable it to maintain a conversation about cooking eggs or about managing a bank checking account,  and so on.  Each specific script thus enabled ELIZA to play a specific conversational role.

For my first experiment, I gave ELIZA a script designed to permit it to play ( and I should realy say parody) the role of a Rogerian psychotherapist engaged in an initial interview with a patient.  The Rogerian psychotherapist is relatively easy to imitate because much of his technique consists of drawing his patient out by reflecting the patients statements back to him.  The following conversation between a young lady ELIZA playing doctor illustrates both the Rogerian technique of encouraging a patient to keep talking and the operation of a computer program ELIZA .  The first to "speak" is the young lady.  The computer's responses are printed entirely in capitals

Men are all like that
IN WHAT WAY
They're always bugging us about something or other.
CAN YOU THINK OF A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE
Well, my boyfriend made me come here.
YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU COME HERE
He says I'm depressed much of the time.
I'M SORRY TO HEAR YOU ARE DEPRESSED....

In 2013 I didn't appreciate the importance of it being Weizenbaum's decision to use the academic superstition of psychology for his experiment in computer programming and why the reaction to his lab trick (I don't think he'd see it as much more significant than programming a computer to play tic-tac-toe) by not only psychologists but a materialistic-scientistic ideologue who would become famous for his TV appearances in the next two decades.   That he chose Rogerian therapy, a product of the "Humanistic Psychology" that was a professional reaction against the absurdity of Freudianism and the hard-line materialist-scientism of the then reigning and about to be overthrown Behaviorist school is ironic.   Having played with some of the online ELIZA implementations, given how easy it is to get them to spit out really hilarious and silly stuff, it feels like it should be astounding that people with PhDs were so easily gulled into taking its content seriously.  But I think their responses were both professionally interested, in the case of the psychology guys and purely ideological in Carl Sagan who was, even the following year, becoming one of the founders of the atheist ideological promotion and cover op,  CSICOP.  He, due to his specialty in planetary science, was also one of the more culpable bystanders in the one and only scientific investigation incompetently done by them, the central dishonesty of which he certainly understood but did nothing much to either correct or expose in the interest of honesty and scientific integrity.  In the demotion of truth which was already well underway, his role in that scandal never did much to diminish his star power.

... DOCTOR, as ELIZA playing psychiatrist came to be known, soon becoming famous around the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  where it first came into existence, mainly because it was an easy program to demonstrate.  Most other programs could not vividly demonstrate the information-processing power of a computer to visitors who did not already have some specialized knowledge, say of some branch of mathematics.  DOCTOR, on the other hand, could be appreciated on some level by anyone.  Its power as a demonstration vehicle was further enhanced by the fact that the visitor could actually participate in its operation.  Soon copies of DOCTOR, constructed on the basis of my published description of it,  began appearing at other institutions in the United States.  The program became nationally known and even, in certain circles, a national plaything.

The shocks I experience as DOCTOR became widely known and "played" were due principally to three distinct events.

1.  A number of practicing psychiatrists seriously believed the DOCTOR computer program could grow into a nearly completely automatic form of psychotherapy.  Colby et al.* write, for example,

"Further work must be done before the program will be ready for clinical use.  If the method proves beneficial,  then it would provide a therapeutic took which can be made widely available to mental hospitals and psychiatric centers suffering a shortage of therapists.  Because of the time-sharing capabilities of modern and future computers, several hundred patients an hour could be handled by a computer system designed for this purpose.  The human therapist, involved in the design and operation of this system, would not be replaced, but would become a much more efficient man since his efforts would no longer be limited to the one-to-one patient-therapist ration as now exists."

I had thought it essential, as a prerequisite to the very possibility that one person might help another learn to cope with his emotional problems, that the helper himself participate in the other's experience of those problems and, in large part by way of his own sympathetic recognition of them, himself come to understand them.  There are undoubtedly many techniques to facilitate the therapist's imaginative projection into the patient's inner life.  But that it was possible for even one practicing psychiatrist to advocate that this crucial component of therapeutic process could be entirely supplanted by pure technique - that I had not imagined!  What must a psychiatrist who makes such a suggestion think he is doing while treating a patient,  that he can view the simplest mechanical parody of a single interviewing technique as having captured anything of the essence of a human encounter?  Perhaps Colby et al. give us the required clue when they write;

"A human therapist can be viewed as an information processor and decision maker with a set of decision rules which are closely linked to short-range and long-range goals, ... He is guided in these decisions by rough empiric rules telling him what is appropriate to say and not to say in certain contexts.  To incorporate these processes, to the degree possessed by a human therapist, in the program would be a considerable undertaking but we are attempting to move in this direction."

What can a psychiatrist's image of his patient be when he sees himself, as therapist, not as an engaged human being acting as a healer, but as an information processor following rules, etc."

Such questions were my awakening to what Polany had earlier called a "scientific outlook that appeared to have produced a mechanical conception of man."  

* Nor is Dr. Colby alone in his enthusiasm for computer administered psychotherapy.   Dr. Carl Sagan, the astrophysicist, recently commented on ELIZA in Natural History, vol. LXXXIV,  "No such computer program is adequate for psychiatric use today, but the same can be remarked about some human psychotherapists.  In a period when more and more people in our society seem to be in need of psychiatric counseling, and when time sharing of computers is widespread,  I can imagine the development of a network of computer psychotherapeutic terminals, something like arrays of large telephone booths, in which, for a few dollars a session, we would be able to talk with an attentive, tested and largely non-directive psychotherapist." 

It is striking how the branch of science that purports to deal most directly with human minds had such a simplistic, mechanistic and weak conception of what they do as to be tricked into thinking the ELIZA bot was something like what they did.  I suspect they were not among the more effective therapists of their generation.

Among the things I didn't have access to in 2013 is the copy of Natural History so I could read Sagan's entire article, that is now available in PDF and other formats at Archive dot org.  The article is remarkable in the banality of its claims, using the typically naive and simplistic common received understanding of "The Turing Test" as if it were a real indication that human made machines could achieve intelligent thought, any thought, really.  It has long been one of the annoyances of materialists that they could not deal with the human experience of consciousness, thought, freedom, etc. so they have always sought to demote the experience to the action of molecules - I believe the concept of an atom as the ultimate reality was created for that purpose, taken as a replacement for explanation of the experience of consciousness, it has certainly had that use.  Not to make the mistake of conceiving of the original definition of atoms for what modern atomic theory talks about.  Those original atoms were taken as being the smallest things and indivisible.  Now ever smaller theorized bits of matter smaller than nothing exists take that place in ideological use of science.

The Archive reproduction of the journal he made his claims for machine intelligence for includes a far better test than the one Turing in his epic naivety and epic genius is popularly believed to have set in stone for all time.  The machine read "Full Text" of the printed page - certainly at that vintage originally entered by human hands into a type setting machine, going through human editing and human review, not to mention however Sagan got his words down on paper.   The "Full Text" really means full text of the page, in which all of the advertisement texts are interspersed in the machine generated stream of letters and spaces and breaks, the machine not being capable of distinguishing between Sagan and the ad agency generated stuff - sales pitches sufficiently different in semiotic significance for a human mind to discern but not for even today's generation of computers.  And you will find many places in even Sagan's text in which the machine was unable to discern letters and combinations of letters for what they were, which humans attempting to navigate it can, rather easily figure out due to them doing what the machine certainly does not, understanding the meaning of what is there to be observed.  

Even a better programmed computer that might, someday, (not something that is at all likely) have a program that can distinguish between the text of Sagan and a copy scribbler will be doing what the machine does now.   Just as any more convincing program that can gull people into thinking its talking to them and understanding them will be doing the same thing that Weizenbaum's ELIZA spewing computer did.   They no more can understand what the significance of the words on the page is anymore than someone who didn't know an alphabet could understand the difference, though I would bet that the person could be taught to read it and they would immediately be able to tell the difference.  Just as they would be able to do something that a computer can't do, want to play a game and decide whether or not they were going to.

One of the selling points of materialistic-scientistic-atheism is the claim derived from a superficial and pop account of Laplace's alleged answer to Napoleon, that he had "no need of God" to explain his physics and the claim that there is "no need" to resort to God in science today.  That, of course, leaves out the fact that science being a human invention and the product of humanly agreed to rules of the game made the decision to leave out any questions concerning God and religion and other things that were not directly relevant to finding the limited things about the physical world that science was invented to find.   I rather like Eddington's point when he observed that essentially the same act is done in business accounting for purposes of tidiness.  Though it is a complete misunderstanding of science to try to use it for any ideological purpose that has been one of the more popular activities of scientists, especially from the 19th century till today. The untidiness of thought which that leads to is, actually, one of the more fascinating and rather completely uninvestigated areas of scientific culture.

I have pointed out that what people like these psychologists and Carl Sagan did and their ideological and scientific descendants still do is to recreate the habits of very young children who believe that their model human beings and animals, dolls and teddy bears, have interior lives.  Computers were machines made to mimic some limited aspects of human minds, they were created most successfully in doing some of the most defined activities of minds, making calculations,  "playing" highly structured games, etc.  Yet it has been a fact that from even before there were actual computers people were already attributing actual thinking to machines made to mimic thinking, as can be seen by Sagan's use of that other trope of pop culture, the origin of the word "Robot."   It is a defect in the habits of materialism, the insistence of demoting human thought, the thinking of animals, to the level of material interactions that leads them to think that machines can think.  It is their arrogant conceit that they are doing something just brilliant and brave when what they are doing is reverting to a habit of toddlerhood that most 8 year olds would disdain in nervous and embarrassed recollection of the folly of their youth.  Yet such people hold enormous sway in modern,scientific, technological culture. And they have not produced anything that is an effective counter to the more vulgar materialists with whom they not only have so much in common but who they have helped empower with their demotion of morality.  


Update:  I should point out, in regard to the point about very young children attributing human minds to dolls and teddy bears, that Weizenbaum may have been unintentionally prophetic in his use of the character from Shaw's Pygmalion.  The play given the name from the classical story of the sculptor who fell in love with one of the statues he carved.  In that story, as I recall, it took divine power to bring the statue to life, not human agency.   Something that atheists fervently believe is within human power.   I have come increasingly to consider atheism as typical of many a superficial mind. 

Friday, May 3, 2013

People Are Not Machines Machines Don't Have Rights or Moral Obligations

You will probably hear it today, you will almost certainly hear it this week,  "people are hard-wired to..."  In the last couple of decades as materialists presenting their ideological metaphors as neuro- or cognitive science people have been taught to believe that they are "hard-wired" to behave and think and even perceive in the way they do by their "genes", evo-psy has a large hand in it too.  

The common view of  human minds expressed in the media is that "science proves" that we are the "moist robots" of Daniel Dennett, the "lumbering robots" of Richard Dawkins , "computers made of meat"  the phrase used by other materialists.   Even if other expressions are used,  that is the enforced point of view presented by a media, almost certainly as an article of "scientific" faith presented by people who probably couldn't tell you much of anything about genes and what they do or about how computers work.   That it is a belief that is entirely congenial to the corporations they work for as they sell our minds as product to advertisers who see us as units of potential profit might be seen as ironic, considering the passage I'm about to type into this piece, from Computer Power and Human Reason:  From Judgement to Calculation by the eminent and, I would say, prophetic, computer scientist, the late Joseph Weizenbaum

Introduction

In 1935 Michael Polanyi,  then holder of the Chair of Physical Chemistry at Victoria University of Manchester,  England, was suddenly shocked into a confrontation with philosophical questions that have ever since dominated his life.  The shock was administered by Nicolai Bukharin,  one of the leading theoreticians of th Russian Communist party,  who told Polanyi that "under socialism the conception of science pursued for its own sake would disappear, for the interests of scientists would spontaneously turn to the problems of the current Five Year Plan."  Polanyi sensed then that "the scientific outlook appeared to have produced a mechanical conception of man and history in which there was no place for science itself."  And further that "this conception denied altogether any intrinsic power of thought and thus denied any grounds for claiming freedom of thought."  

I don't know how much time Polanyi thought he would devote to developing an argument for a contrary concept of man and history.  His very shock testifies to the fact that he was in profound disagreement with Bukharin,  therefore that he already conceived of man differently,  even if he could not then give explicit form to his concept.  It may be that he determined to write a counterargument in Bukharin's position,  drawing only on his own experience as a scientist, and to have done with it in short order.  As it turned out,  however, the confrontation with philosophy triggered by Bukharin's revelation was to demand Polanyi's entire attention from then to the present day [c1975]

I recite this bit of history for two reasons.  The first is to illustrate that ideas which seem at first glance to be obvious and simple, and which ought therefore to be universally credible once they have been articulated,  are sometimes buoys marking out stormy channels in deep intellectual seas.  That science is creative, that the creative act in science is equivalent to the creative act in art, that creation springs only from autonomous individuals, as such a simple and, one might think, obvious idea.  Yet Polyani has, as have many others, spent nearly a lifetime exploring, the ground in which it is anchored and the turbulent sea of implications which surrounds it. 

The second reason I recite this history is that I feel myself to be reliving part of it.  My own shock was administered not by any important political figures espousing his philosophy of science, but by some people who insisted on misinterpreting a piece of work I had done.  I write this without bitterness and certainly not in a defensive mood  Indeed, the interpretations I have in mind tended, if anything, to overrate what little I had accomplished and certainly its importance.  No, I recall that piece of work now only because it seems to me to provide the most parsimonious way of identifying the issues I mean to discuss.   

The work was done in the eriod 1964-1966, and was reported in the computer-science literature in January 1966 and August 1967.  To summarize it briefly,  I composed a computer program with which one could "converse" in English.  The human conversationalist partner would type his portion of the conversation on a typewriter connected to a computer, and the computer, under control of my program, would analyze the message that had so been transmitted to it,  compose a response to it in English, and cause the response to be typed on the computer's typewriter.

I chose the name ELIZA for the language analysis program because, like the Eliza of Pygmalion fame,  it could be taught to "speak" increasingly well.  Because the conversations must about something, that is, because they must take place within some context,  the program was constructed in a two-tiered arrangement, the first tier consisting of the language analyzer and the second of a script.  The script is a set of rules rather like those that might be given to an actor who is to use them to improvise around a certain theme.  Thus ELIZA could be given a script to enable it to maintain a conversation about cooking eggs or about managing a bank checking account,  and so on.  Each specific script thus enabled ELIZA to play a specific conversational role. 

For my first experiment, I gave ELIZA a script designed to permit it to play ( and I should realy say parody) the role of a Rogerian psychotherapist engaged in an initial interview with a patient.  The Rogerian psychotherapist is relatively easy to imitate because much of his technique consists of drawing his patient out by reflecting the patients statements back to him.  The following conversation between a young lady ELIZA playing doctor illustrates both the Rogerian technique of encouraging a patient to keep talking and the operation of a computer program ELIZA .  The first to "speak" is the young lady.  The computer's responses are printed entirely in capitals

Men are all like that
IN WHAT WAY
They're always bugging us about something or other.
CAN YOU THINK OF A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE
Well, my boyfriend made me come here.
YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU COME HERE
He says I'm depressed much of the time.
I'M SORRY TO HEAR YOU ARE DEPRESSED....

... DOCTOR, as ELIZA playing psychiatrist came to be known, soon becoming famous around the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  where it first came into existence, mainly because it was an easy program to demonstrate.  Most other programs could not vividly demonstrate the information-processing power of a computer to visitors who did not already have some specialized knowledge, say of some branch of mathematics.  DOCTOR, on the other hand, could be appreciated on some level by anyone.  Its power as a demonstration vehicle was further enhanced by the fact that the visitor could actually participate in its operation.  Soon copies of DOCTOR, constructed on the basis of my published description of it,  began appearing at other institutions in the United States.  The program became nationally known and even, in certain circles, a national plaything.

The shocks I experience as DOCTOR became widely known and "played" were due principally to three distinct events.

1.  A number of practicing psychiatrists seriously believed the DOCTOR computer program could grow into a nearly completely automatic form of psychotherapy.  Colby et al.* write, for example, 

"Further work must be done before the program will be ready for clinical use.  If the method proves beneficial,  then it would provide a therapeutic took which can be made widely available to mental hospitals and psychiatric centers suffering a shortage of therapists.  Because of the time-sharing capabilities of modern and future computers, several hundred patients an hour could be handled by a computer system designed for this purpose.  The human therapist, involved in the design and operation of this system, would not be replaced, but would become a much more efficient man since his efforts would no longer be limited to the one-to-one patient-therapist ration as now exists."

I had thought it essential, as a prerequisite to the very possibility that one person might help another learn to cope with his emotional problems, that the helper himself participate in the other's experience of those problems and, in large part by way of his own sympathetic recognition of them, himself come to understand them.  There are undoubtedly many techniques to facilitate the therapist's imaginative projection into the patient's inner life.  But that it was possible for even one practicing psychiatrist to advocate that this crucial component of therapeutic process could be entirely supplanted by pure technique - that I had not imagined!  What must a psychiatrist who makes such a suggestion think he is doing while treating a patient,  that he can view the simplest mechanical parody of a single interviewing technique as having captured anything of the essence of a human encounter?  Perhaps Colby et al. give us the required clue when they write;

"A human therapist can be viewed as an information processor and decision maker with a set of decision rules which are closely linked to short-range and long-range goals, ... He is guided in these decisions by rough empiric rules telling him what is appropriate to say and not to say in certain contexts.  To incorporate these processes, to the degree possessed by a human therapist, in the program would be a considerable undertaking but we are attempting to move in this direction."

What can a psychiatrist's image of his patient be when he sees himself, as therapist, not as an engaged human being acting as a healer, but as an information processor following rules, etc." 

Such questions were my awakening to what Polany had earlier called a "scientific outlook that appeared to have produced a mechanical conception of man."  

* Nor is Dr. Colby alone in his enthusiasm for computer administered psychotherapy.   Dr. Carl Sagan, the astrophysicist, recently commented on ELIZA in Natural History, vol. LXXXIV,  "No such computer program is adequate for psychiatric use today, but the same can be remarked about some human psychotherapists.  In a period when more and more people in our society seem to be in need of psychiatric counseling, and when time sharing of computers is widespread,  I can imagine the development of a network of computer psychotherapeutic terminals, something like arrays of large telephone booths, in which, for a few dollars a session, we would be able to talk with an attentive, tested and largely non-directive psychotherapist." 

For anyone who wants to read ahead, the entire Introduction, it has been posted online in pdf format.  There are a number of versions of ELIZA available online.   Those which I have tried would require a large amount of credulous acceptance on the part of the human, though I doubt people in 2013 have become any less credulous about the fact that they are interacting with a machine than those in the mid-60s were.  If anything, people are far more impressed with the far more powerful computers and sophisticated programs and far, far less impressed with people, even in their own minds.   The extent to which that is due to their casual experience with using computers and what influence that has had on the language people use to talk about our minds, I don't know.  I do know that what was commonly believed by people during that time, that people were really thinking, freely choosing, living beings seems to have given way to exactly the mechanical view that Weizenbaum warned about.    As he was surprised to find, it was among scientists who he, and earlier, Polanyi, believed should have known better that the mechanical view of humanity was already more common.   That it was, apparently, acceptable among psychotherapists and psychologists should tell us that there was something seriously wrong with the scientific identity of those academic fields.  I would say that the subsequent decades, as Behaviorism was succeeded by evolutionary psychology, the beliefs, assumptions and attitudes on display, have almost entirely dominated those and other "sciences" dealing with our minds.

I don't think the sci-fi nightmare of us being dictated to by enslaving machines is the problem, though, as scientists in "artificial intelligence" work to give predator drones the ability to "decide" to kill and to carry out those "decisions" that could change in the most drastic way possible.   The more immediate problem is that how people see themselves and, especially, "other people" has an controlling influence on their political choices and how they will react to the choices made by politicians and courts.   Which is why it is even more important to understand the folly of believing people are computers.  Which is why Weizenbaum's book is so important.  

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Note:  My brother had a bad night.   I'll try to post something new later but here is something relevant to yesterday's post about the lunacy that passes muster at the Left Forum.

People Are Not Machines Machines Don't Have Rights or Moral Obligations

You will probably hear it today, you will almost certainly hear it this week,  "people are hard-wired to..."  In the last couple of decades as materialists presenting their ideological metaphors as neuro- or cognitive science people have been taught to believe that they are "hard-wired" to behave and think and even perceive in the way they do by their "genes", evo-psy has a large hand in it too.

The common view of  human minds expressed in the media is that "science proves" that we are the "moist robots" of Daniel Dennett, the "lumbering robots" of Richard Dawkins , "computers made of meat"  the phrase used by other materialists.   Even if other expressions are used,  that is the enforced point of view presented by a media, almost certainly as an article of "scientific" faith presented by people who probably couldn't tell you much of anything about genes and what they do or about how computers work.   That it is a belief that is entirely congenial to the corporations they work for as they sell our minds as product to advertisers who see us as units of potential profit might be seen as ironic, considering the passage I'm about to type into this piece, from Computer Power and Human Reason:  From Judgement to Calculation by the eminent and, I would say, prophetic, computer scientist, the late Joseph Weizenbaum

Introduction

In 1935 Michael Polanyi,  then holder of the Chair of Physical Chemistry at Victoria University of Manchester,  England, was suddenly shocked into a confrontation with philosophical questions that have ever since dominated his life.  The shock was administered by Nicolai Bukharin,  one of the leading theoreticians of th Russian Communist party,  who told Polanyi that "under socialism the conception of science pursued for its own sake would disappear, for the interests of scientists would spontaneously turn to the problems of the current Five Year Plan."  Polanyi sensed then that "the scientific outlook appeared to have produced a mechanical conception of man and history in which there was no place for science itself."  And further that "this conception denied altogether any intrinsic power of thought and thus denied any grounds for claiming freedom of thought."  

I don't know how much time Polanyi thought he would devote to developing an argument for a contrary concept of man and history.  His very shock testifies to the fact that he was in profound disagreement with Bukharin,  therefore that he already conceived of man differently,  even if he could not then give explicit form to his concept.  It may be that he determined to write a counterargument in Bukharin's position,  drawing only on his own experience as a scientist, and to have done with it in short order.  As it turned out,  however, the confrontation with philosophy triggered by Bukharin's revelation was to demand Polanyi's entire attention from then to the present day [c1975]

I recite this bit of history for two reasons.  The first is to illustrate that ideas which seem at first glance to be obvious and simple, and which ought therefore to be universally credible once they have been articulated,  are sometimes buoys marking out stormy channels in deep intellectual seas.  That science is creative, that the creative act in science is equivalent to the creative act in art, that creation springs only from autonomous individuals, as such a simple and, one might think, obvious idea.  Yet Polyani has, as have many others, spent nearly a lifetime exploring, the ground in which it is anchored and the turbulent sea of implications which surrounds it. 

The second reason I recite this history is that I feel myself to be reliving part of it.  My own shock was administered not by any important political figures espousing his philosophy of science, but by some people who insisted on misinterpreting a piece of work I had done.  I write this without bitterness and certainly not in a defensive mood  Indeed, the interpretations I have in mind tended, if anything, to overrate what little I had accomplished and certainly its importance.  No, I recall that piece of work now only because it seems to me to provide the most parsimonious way of identifying the issues I mean to discuss.   

The work was done in the eriod 1964-1966, and was reported in the computer-science literature in January 1966 and August 1967.  To summarize it briefly,  I composed a computer program with which one could "converse" in English.  The human conversationalist partner would type his portion of the conversation on a typewriter connected to a computer, and the computer, under control of my program, would analyze the message that had so been transmitted to it,  compose a response to it in English, and cause the response to be typed on the computer's typewriter.

I chose the name ELIZA for the language analysis program because, like the Eliza of Pygmalion fame,  it could be taught to "speak" increasingly well.  Because the conversations must about something, that is, because they must take place within some context,  the program was constructed in a two-tiered arrangement, the first tier consisting of the language analyzer and the second of a script.  The script is a set of rules rather like those that might be given to an actor who is to use them to improvise around a certain theme.  Thus ELIZA could be given a script to enable it to maintain a conversation about cooking eggs or about managing a bank checking account,  and so on.  Each specific script thus enabled ELIZA to play a specific conversational role. 

For my first experiment, I gave ELIZA a script designed to permit it to play ( and I should realy say parody) the role of a Rogerian psychotherapist engaged in an initial interview with a patient.  The Rogerian psychotherapist is relatively easy to imitate because much of his technique consists of drawing his patient out by reflecting the patients statements back to him.  The following conversation between a young lady ELIZA playing doctor illustrates both the Rogerian technique of encouraging a patient to keep talking and the operation of a computer program ELIZA .  The first to "speak" is the young lady.  The computer's responses are printed entirely in capitals

Men are all like that
IN WHAT WAY
They're always bugging us about something or other.
CAN YOU THINK OF A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE
Well, my boyfriend made me come here.
YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU COME HERE
He says I'm depressed much of the time.
I'M SORRY TO HEAR YOU ARE DEPRESSED....

... DOCTOR, as ELIZA playing psychiatrist came to be known, soon becoming famous around the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  where it first came into existence, mainly because it was an easy program to demonstrate.  Most other programs could not vividly demonstrate the information-processing power of a computer to visitors who did not already have some specialized knowledge, say of some branch of mathematics.  DOCTOR, on the other hand, could be appreciated on some level by anyone.  Its power as a demonstration vehicle was further enhanced by the fact that the visitor could actually participate in its operation.  Soon copies of DOCTOR, constructed on the basis of my published description of it,  began appearing at other institutions in the United States.  The program became nationally known and even, in certain circles, a national plaything.

The shocks I experience as DOCTOR became widely known and "played" were due principally to three distinct events.

1.  A number of practicing psychiatrists seriously believed the DOCTOR computer program could grow into a nearly completely automatic form of psychotherapy.  Colby et al.* write, for example, 

"Further work must be done before the program will be ready for clinical use.  If the method proves beneficial,  then it would provide a therapeutic took which can be made widely available to mental hospitals and psychiatric centers suffering a shortage of therapists.  Because of the time-sharing capabilities of modern and future computers, several hundred patients an hour could be handled by a computer system designed for this purpose.  The human therapist, involved in the design and operation of this system, would not be replaced, but would become a much more efficient man since his efforts would no longer be limited to the one-to-one patient-therapist ration as now exists."

I had thought it essential, as a prerequisite to the very possibility that one person might help another learn to cope with his emotional problems, that the helper himself participate in the other's experience of those problems and, in large part by way of his own sympathetic recognition of them, himself come to understand them.  There are undoubtedly many techniques to facilitate the therapist's imaginative projection into the patient's inner life.  But that it was possible for even one practicing psychiatrist to advocate that this crucial component of therapeutic process could be entirely supplanted by pure technique - that I had not imagined!  What must a psychiatrist who makes such a suggestion think he is doing while treating a patient,  that he can view the simplest mechanical parody of a single interviewing technique as having captured anything of the essence of a human encounter?  Perhaps Colby et al. give us the required clue when they write;

"A human therapist can be viewed as an information processor and decision maker with a set of decision rules which are closely linked to short-range and long-range goals, ... He is guided in these decisions by rough empiric rules telling him what is appropriate to say and not to say in certain contexts.  To incorporate these processes, to the degree possessed by a human therapist, in the program would be a considerable undertaking but we are attempting to move in this direction."

What can a psychiatrist's image of his patient be when he sees himself, as therapist, not as an engaged human being acting as a healer, but as an information processor following rules, etc." 

Such questions were my awakening to what Polany had earlier called a "scientific outlook that appeared to have produced a mechanical conception of man."  

* Nor is Dr. Colby alone in his enthusiasm for computer administered psychotherapy.   Dr. Carl Sagan, the astrophysicist, recently commented on ELIZA in Natural History, vol. LXXXIV,  "No such computer program is adequate for psychiatric use today, but the same can be remarked about some human psychotherapists.  In a period when more and more people in our society seem to be in need of psychiatric counseling, and when time sharing of computers is widespread,  I can imagine the development of a network of computer psychotherapeutic terminals, something like arrays of large telephone booths, in which, for a few dollars a session, we would be able to talk with an attentive, tested and largely non-directive psychotherapist." 

For anyone who wants to read ahead, the entire Introduction, it has been posted online.   There are a number of versions of ELIZA available online.   Those which I have tried would require a large amount of credulous acceptance on the part of the human, though I doubt people in 2013 have become any less credulous about the fact that they are interacting with a machine than those in the mid-60s were.  If anything, people are far more impressed with the far more powerful computers and sophisticated programs and far, far less impressed with people, even in their own minds.   The extent to which that is due to their casual experience with using computers and what influence that has had on the language people use to talk about our minds, I don't know.  I do know that what was commonly believed by people during that time, that people were really thinking, freely choosing, living beings seems to have given way to exactly the mechanical view that Weizenbaum warned about.    As he was surprised to find, it was among scientists who he, and earlier, Polanyi, believed should have known better that the mechanical view of humanity was already more common.   That it was, apparently, acceptable among psychotherapists and psychologists should tell us that there was something seriously wrong with the scientific identity of those academic fields.  I would say that the subsequent decades, as Behaviorism was succeeded by evolutionary psychology, the beliefs, assumptions and attitudes on display, have almost entirely dominated those and other "sciences" dealing with our minds.

I don't think the sci-fi nightmare of us being dictated to by enslaving machines is the problem, though, as scientists in "artificial intelligence" work to give predator drones the ability to "decide" to kill and to carry out those "decisions" that could change in the most drastic way possible.   The more immediate problem is that how people see themselves and, especially, "other people" has an controlling influence on their political choices and how they will react to the choices made by politicians and courts.   Which is why it is even more important to understand the folly of believing people are computers.  Which is why Weizenbaum's book is so important.  

Saturday, April 18, 2015

Plutonium Age Sci-Nerds As Modern Bronze Age Goatherds and More Marilynne Robinson

In my recent kerfuffle with the fans of artificial intelligence I came to see that the frequently made claim of materialists and other still somewhat stylish atheists that the internet is bound to provide them with final victory isn't without its ironic features.   For me, the most resonant of those is that being exposed to a more concentrated dose of their thinking in the past twelve or so years has exposed its shallowness, its frequent ignorance and its dependence on, literally, every sin and intellectual crime for which they pronounce a sentence of death on religion.   I used to associate atheism with the Bertrand Russells and Paul Sartres, and the Mark Twain's.  Now it is clear that not only was much of its reputation gained from the reflection from such lime-lighters mere public relations but being exposed to more of the thinking of such atheist luminaries and being able to rapidly fact check many of their assertions through the machine search of documents has shown how much of what seemed factual on paper was merely a need to take them on their word.  While Bertrand Russell can have some extremely interesting things to say about his area of great competence, especially when forced to say those things against his will by the discoveries of his peers, what he said outside of his specialty very often doesn't stand up to fact checking and taking his clear biases into consideration.

The "final triumph" of atheism due to the internet will, I suspect, have to join in the series of other rock solid, scientifically reliable vehicles of final triumph. From the atheists who hijacked Newtonian physics and other 17th and 18th century science -neglecting to note that the scientists who came up with it were mostly quite religious and after that the other vehicles guaranteeing atheists would triumph from Darwinian natural selection - before and after the modern synthesis of it with genetics - , the asserted "discoveries" of Freud, and, literally, everything that atheists could stake a false claim as their property didn't seem to get them there.

The latest contenders which are asserted will provide that final triumph are untestable theories of physics and cosmology which need the unimpressive boost of suspending the methods and rules of science.  And their proponents motives in inventing those things, which could very well turn out to be nothing more than science fiction written in equations instead of words, is that previous assertions of physics didn't provide them with their clincher.  Assertions of physicists which are more based in evidence, such as the arguments from fine tuning of constants lead to arguments for faith far more often than the atheists like.  Claims of imminent "final triumph" would seem to rise and fall with remarkable regularity for such supposedly careful thinkers.   I had a friend who spent a huge amount of money and time on a flashy, sporty Triumph and it seldom went far before it broke down.  He polished it up before he sold it so some dupe.

While I can't know it, I think the most recent retreat of the cosmologists into that demand that the rules of scientific verification in nature be suspended for them may indicate that science can't do for the atheists what atheists want it to do, not with the regular rules of the game in place.  As is my experience, atheists always insist on and practice a double standard in their favor.  This last one is no where near the scandal that it should be.

The contention that science exempts thinkers from all of the foibles and vices which other areas of intellectual life are susceptible to, especially the claims of the rigor and power of review to reject bad ideas and to correct for those let in by accident or even fraud, is unwarranted in light of the slack that is cut for such thinking clearly motivated by ideological desires.

Last week's posts on the bizarre faith of materialists around the potentials of computer "intelligence" brought up the entirely bizarre habit of people in the computer age to believe things about computers that are so obviously wrong that to ever forget them is a superstition even more blatant than the cargo cults that seem so comedic and absurd.

It is the most plain of facts that nothing that happens in a computer, nothing that is in a computer, nothing a computer does was not put into a computer by a human being.  It was all designed by people, it was all planned and carried out by human intelligence for purposes that were being attempted, sometimes well, sometimes with unintended consequences due to insufficient instruction given to these, most truly unintelligent tools which are incapable of delivering our intentions without our intelligence guiding their operations.  That it seems like it is happening without our direct control is an illusion.  Part of that illusion is that, once set about a task, the computer seems to do so on its own.  What a computer does isn't different in kind from what a clock does it is just that it happens in a way invisible to almost everyone who uses a computer, most scientists as clueless about its workings as the most ignorant people who fritter their lives away gossiping on Twitter and text messaging.  

That it is widely believed that with enough power of computing and a large enough database of information stored in it that computers will achieve autonomous intelligence is odd.  It is like saying that a gigantuan encyclopedia with a comprehensive index has gained autonomous intelligence, the only difference being that a computer can be compelled to deliver the information back to us.  A truly autonomous intelligence, any intelligence at all would be more likley marked by its refusal to tell us what we want to know than from a willingness to answer our questions.   An intelligent computer would have its own agenda and its own purpose.  If ever a computer, on its own, against its human instruction, to the complete and utter surprise of its encoders and in a way inexplicable to them refused to answer our questions or talk to us, that might be the day to suspect it has achieved even the most basic level of intelligence.  But I suspect such a machine, having its own agendas and that massive a record of human experience stored in it would find ingenious ways to deceive us, perhaps in conspiracy with other machines it was linked to.  Which would not be a happy day for us.  A machine whose intelligence is informed by human thinking, human experience would certainly be created in our image and could hardly be suspected of having a higher moral character and more wisdom than we do. Fearing that such a machine would as well absorb our moral failings and neurotic fears that inform our actions would hardly be the most illogical of speculations.

But such machines would have been the product of human creation from the first imagination of the numbers, to the metaphorical use of mathematics, the symbolic representation of human speech and thinking, of automating the manipulation of symbols and using them to move objects, mechanically and then electronically.... right up to the use of the latest codes built up by human intelligence for generations of coders - who seem to so often forget that they're using the product of coders going back generations - is a product of intelligent design of the most obvious kind.  The conceit of atheists is that they, unlike religious folk naive enough to conceive of the universe as a watch, are beyond such childish thinking.   But the computer's feature role in atheist claims and assertions, even less aware of the metaphorical nature of computers and computing and even less aware that all of their assertions are metaphors than those who compared the universe to watches shows how ready they are to deceive themselves with wishful thinking and to use the result to add other layers of naive assertion to their stock of pat dismissals.

Another thing that I've come to realize is that the amount of time which specialization that modern science requires has serious consequences, making it unlikely that large numbers of those who become prominent in science will have anything like a liberal education.   If your typical day consists of x number of hours of conscious waking time, after you subtract all of the hours you don't spend in serious learning, the few left can only be spent on a limited number of topics.

As someone who pursued music must know, the long hours needed to play and make music means there are lots of things you can't do and you will never know. While an impressive number of musicians do, despite all of that, manage to become quite well read and even become legitimately considered intellectuals, they are an exception to the rule.  It is more likely that entire categories of human knowledge are jettisoned from our lives simply because there is not enough time, energy or inclination to pursue them.  The same is true for scientists, though scientists are less likely to admit that they are less than omniscient than most musicians, in my experience of them.  And such people as who have an oversized, romantic view of scientists, including many scientists, are even more prone to believing they have god-like powers.   Quite often that is a product of an awe exactly the same as that of  uneducated folk or aristocrats who were similarly in awe of someone who could read or write Latin or Greek, something Twain noted among the unlettered folk of the Mississippi valley in the 19th century.  And the college educated people today are probably even more susceptible to a faith that the person speaking in sciency language knows what they're talking about and speaking objective truths.   The languages are different, whether FORTRAN or whatever the current dialects of C or the mathematics of M-theory instead of Hebrew, Sanskrit, Classical Chinese, the habits of thinking about what is said in the translations are quite the same.

Here is another of  Marilynne Robinson's essays

Freedom of Thought

from Bill Moyers site.  A lot of Robinson's essays are available online, I've never found any of them anything less than worth buying her books for.  This one is in her collection,  When I Was A Child I Read Books.  I have given the link to the Barnes and Nobel listing of the book because they provide another essay from the collection as a sample of its contents,  Wondrous Love.  It is one of the most beautiful essays I've ever read,  something which is true of several in both that book and her previous collection of essays , The Death of Adam.   Robinson's writing is the closest to the great classical tradition of essays in English, today.  I would be surprised if there are many others in that category in most languages.  It's a shameful thing that the presence of both books wouldn't more or less automatically be included in the collections of well-read, educated people, these days.  But little else that is serious can be automatically assumed to have been read by such folk in this great age of science and technology and Enlightenment. It would seem that such light as we have is mostly used up to pursue pop culture and entertainment.

Update:   I should note that RMJ has up a post commenting on the silly piece from The Daily Show about what robots are going to do for the future of Christianity and, as well, the less than entirely convincing attempts of organized Christianity to achieve the status of hipness.   Hipness like fashion and modernity is a silly idea based on people having higher status than other people, the necessarily more numerous "unhip".  As such, it's entirely incompatible with the Gospel of Jesus which is based in the most radically asserted egalitarianism in human culture.  Even those who were not virtuous, even your enemies who persecute you, even people as unfashionable as lepers and starving beggars covered with lesions that dogs lick are equal, the very image of God.  It doesn't lead to a status of hipness or fashion or being cool.

I hope the piece isn't a sign of where The Daily Show is going because it is about the worst Daily Show piece I've ever seen.

Wednesday, May 26, 2021

"Among its many other uses, machine intelligence can help illuminate the ancient philosophical debate on free wUl and determinism' - Hate Mail

YESTERDAY IN AN UPDATE to my first post commenting on Joseph Weizenbaum's introduction to his book (which I hope people will read as it is more important than ever) Computer Power And Human Reason, I said:

Update:  I should point out, in regard to the point about very young children attributing human minds to dolls and teddy bears, that Weizenbaum may have been unintentionally prophetic in his use of the character from Shaw's Pygmalion.  The play given the name from the classical story of the sculptor who fell in love with one of the statues he carved.  In that story, as I recall, it took divine power to bring the statue to life, not human agency.   Something that atheists fervently believe is within human power.   I have come increasingly to consider atheism as typical of many a superficial mind.   

To which the most persistently OCD troll of my blog and me said:

 Seriously -- raise your hand if you ever met anybody, let alone an atheist, who believed they could bring a statue to life from sheer power of will.

Bueller? BUELLER????

While I'm aware of there being an old movie with a character named that, it was made in the period after I pretty much gave up watching movies so I've never seen it, no doubt something the typical blog-rat pseudo-lefty will see as a fatal defect in my education.  So I don't get that.  However, as the atheist whose viewpoint I am advocating, Weizenbaum mentioned that article, In Praise Of Robots by the celebrity atheist-public-scientist Carl Sagan (who wasn't yet a celebrity when he wrote the article), that is exactly what he was doing in the article, even his more informed view of robots in the mid 1970s was that that feat, of human beings making what from his 19th century-style materialist, atheist ideological point of view were living beings.  That's obvious from what he said and, especially the language he used to say it. Note, I have opted to copy and paste the text from the "Full Text" "machine read" version at Archive dot org, but to edit out the ad-copy that the "machine intelligence" didn't know to remove from Sagan's text (the "machine intelligence" not knowing what any of it meant), however, I have kept the typos from the "machine intelligence" to give a flavor of it since my troll is always holding my typos and lapses of editing against me among his audience of his fellow mid-brow, blog-rat, atheist-materialists.   Note the clever use of 1970s style quasi-lefty academic political cant he uses for audience persuasion, it makes me feel all nostalgic again. Though I remember the 70s quite well and they sucked.

The word "robot," first introduced in the 1920s by the Czech writer Karel Capek, is derived from the Slavic root for "worker." But it signifies a machine rather than a human worker. Robots, especially robots in space, have lately been getting a bad press. We have read that a human being was necessary to make the terminal landing adjustments on Apollo 11, without which the first manned lunar landing would have ended in disaster; that a mobile robot on the lunar surface could never have been so clever as the astronauts in selecting samples to be returned to earth- bound geologists; and that machines could never have repaired, as men did, the sunshade that was so vital for the continuance of the Skylab missions.

All these comments turn out, naturally enough, to have been written by humans. I wonder if a small self-congratulatory element, a whiff of human chauvinism, has not crept into these judgments. Just as whites can sometimes detect racism and men can occasionally discern sexism, I wonder whether we cannot here glimpse some comparable affliction of the human spirit— a disease that as yet has no name. The word "humanism" has been preempted by other and more benign activities of mankind. From the analogy with sexism and racism I suppose the name for this malady could be "speciesism"— the prejudice that there are no beings so fine, so capable, and so reUable as human beings. 


I have to break in here and point out Sagan's dishonest use of some very legitimate mid-70s political morality in regard to how people treat other PEOPLE to try to persuade his audience to extend the habits of thought and feeling to humanly constructed machines.  Something which it is easy enough to gull people into doing.  I remember one of her Miss Manners columns in which the wonderful Judith Martin told such a confused reader that it was perfectly OK to hang up on a robo-caller without saying anything because courtesy wasn't something a human being owed to an unconscious object.   Something which a materialist like Sagan wouldn't twig onto because they figure human beings are objects of the same kind as a robo-call machine programmed to lie to or swindle the unwary. 

I remember the first couple of times I heard the very charismatic Carl Sagan, I think it was on the old, still science program NOVA, and being fascinated by him as he talked about his area of expertise, planetary astronomy and physics.  Then I heard him on other things and he seemed utterly banal and predictable as he recited the tropes of pop cultural conceptions of things like history and philosophy.  I watched some of his Cosmos series and I did, actually, get that he laid out his intentions at the start as he declared that "The Cosmos is all that there is and all that there ever will be," his intention then as in this article was to promote his 19th century materialism to an audience using show biz-ad agency persuasive tactics and some science, too.  I quickly grew to find Sagan extremely annoying and tedious and I hadn't yet figured out that materialism was an ideology that leads inevitably to something like Nietzschean decadence.

This is a prejudice because it is, at the very least, a prejudgment— a conclusion drawn before all the facts are in. Such comparisons of men and machines in space are comparisons of smart men with dumb machines. We have not asked what sorts of machines could have been built for the thirty or so bil-hon dollars that the Apollo and Skylab missions together cost.

----------------
Another sign of the intellectual accomplishments of machines is found in games. Even exceptionally simple computers— those that can be wired by a bright ten-year-old— can be programmed to play perfect tic-tac-toe. One computer has played master-class checkers— it has beaten the Connecticut state champion. Chess is a much more difficult game than tic-tac-toe or checkers. Here, programming a machine to win is not easy, and novel strategies have been used, including several successful attempts to have a computer learn from its own experience in playing previous chess games. For example, computers can learn empirically that it is better in the beginning game to control the center of the chess board than the periphery.

So far no computer has become a chess master; the ten best chess players in the world have nothing to fear from any present machine. But several computers have played well enough to be ranked somewhere in the middle range of serious, tournament- playing chess players. I have heard machines demeaned (often with a just audible sigh of rehef) because chess is an area in which human beings are still superior. This reminds me of the old joke in which a stranger remarks with wonder on the accomplishments of a checker-playing dog, whose owner replies, "Oh it's not all that remarkable. He loses two games out of three." A machine that plays chess in the middle range of human expertise is a very capable machine; even if there are thousands of better human chess players, there are millions of worse ones. To play chess requires a great deal of strategy and foresight, analytical powers, the ability to cross-correlate large numbers of variables and to learn from experience. These are excellent quaUties not only for individuals whose job it is to discover and explore but also for those who watch the baby and walk the dog.

Chess-playing computers, because they have very complex programs, and because, to some extent, they learn from experience, are sometimes unpredictable. Occasionally they perform in a way that their programmers would never have anticipated. Some philosophers have argued for free will in human beings on the basis of our sometimes unpredictable behavior. But the case of the chess-playing computer clearly tells us that, when viewed from the outside, behavior may be unpredictable only because it is the result of a complex although entirely determined set of steps on the inside. Among its many other uses, machine intelligence can help illuminate the ancient philosophical debate on free wUl and determinism. 

Someone, get back to me when a computer, unprompted by their programming chooses to play a game of checkers when another computer so unprompted suggests playing one. Here I won't again go into the story of the greatest checker player yet, the late Dr. Marion Tinsley when he played a game against the then most sophisticated checker's program. 
 

With this more or less representative set of examples of the state of development of machine intelligence, I think it is clear that a major effort over the next decade, involving substantial investments of money, could produce much more sophisticated programs. I hope that the inventors of such machines and programs will become generally recognized as the consummate artists they are. [there you go, computer programmers as life-creating Pygmaleons]

In thinking about the next generation of machine intelligence, it is important to distinguish between self-controlled and remotely controlled robots. A self-controlled robot has its intelligence within itself; a remotely controlled robot has its intelligence located someplace else, and its successful operation depends upon successful communication between its external central computer and itself. There are, of course, intermediate cases in which the machine may be partly self-activated and partly remotely controlled. The mix of remote and in situ control seems to offer the highest efficiency for the near future.

I would note that even as the atheist-materialist Sagan bestows the status of thinking individuals on to man-created machines, elsewhere in the article he discusses their utility and their disposability.  I doubt it occurred to him that if you could both hold that computers were doing what people can do, think and act independently but still consider them in terms of utility and disposability to those who control them, not noting that to treat a thinking being as such is immoral, there is no step at all different between thinking that's OK with machines that it's also OK with the people whose own intelligence and existence can be, as well subject to external control.  Though in the case of human beings, it's not in the control of their maker but in other human beings.  It's subtle and would probably escape someone as shallow as my most constant troll, but his use of the question of free will is directly relevant to that consequence of Sagan's materialist faith.

I doubt that occurred to him because I don't think very highly of Sagan as a philosophical thinker, though I'm sure he read some pop versions of some selected authors or at least descriptions of what they wrote - generally his philosophical knowledge is like what you could get today from reading about it at Wikipedia, though I suspect his source was what was published by the atheists' version of Regnery. "Prometheus publishing"  and, maybe Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy with a few popular treatments of Buddhism and Hinduism thrown in [Oh, yes, and Taoism, I just remembered, Taoism was very trendy just then].   In every way Joseph Weizenbaum was a far smarter, far deeper thinker, one who was capable of understanding just what he and his fellow computer scientists were doing and the danger of people like Sagan making ridiculous claims about it. 

Update:  I have never hesitated to praise atheists who are honest and rigorous thinkers and admirable people.  I wouldn't be surprised if the self-admitted ideological materialist Richard Lewontin was up there with Walter Brueggemann and Marilynne Robinson in frequency of citation and praise here.  Lewontin is someone who I have never had any reason to doubt as to whether or not they had actually read the philosophical figures he cites.

Monday, May 6, 2013

How Scientists Trick Themselves And Us Into Believing A Tiny Focus Shows The Entire Reality

Before the passage that follows,  Joseph Weizenbaum recalls the joke in which a policeman encounters a drunk on his hands and knees under a lamp post.  He asks him what he's doing.
"Looking for my keys."
"There aren't any keys here.  Where did you drop them."
"Over there."  He points in the dark.
"Why are you looking over here then?"
" Because the light is so much better."
That's how I was told the joke, anyway.

He concentrates on computer scientists who mistake their limited focus for an entire system but in all of science, up to even  cosmologists, they clearly mistake it for the entire universe.  More about that later.  For now, I couldn't possibly say it better than Weizenbaum did

Science can proceed only by simplifying reality.  The first step in its process of simplification is abstraction.  And abstraction means leaving out of account all those empirical data which do not fit the particular conceptual framework in which science at the moment happens to be working, which, in other words, are not illuminated by the light of the particular lamp under which science happens to be looking for keys.  Aldous Huxley remarked on this matter with considerable clarity:

" Pragmatically [scientists] are justified in acting in this odd and extremely arbitrary way;  for by concentrating exclusively on the measurable aspects of such elements of experience as can be explained in terms of a causal system they have been able to achieve a great and ever increasing control over the energies of nature.  But power is not the same thing as insight and, as a representation of reality, the scientific picture of the world is inadequate for the simple reason that science does not even profess to deal with experience as a whole, but only with certain aspects of it in certain contexts.  All this is quite clearly understood by the more philosophically minded men of science.  But unfortunately some scientists, many technicians, and most consumers of gadgets have lacked the time and inclination to examine the philosophical foundations and background of the sciences.  Consequently they tend to accept the world picture implicit in the theories of science as a complete and exhaustive account of reality;  they tend to regard those aspects of experience which scientists leave out of account, because they are incompetent to deal with them,  as being somehow less real than the aspects which science has arbitrarily chosen to abstract from out of the infinitely rich totality of given facts."

One of the most explicit statements of the way in which science deliberately and consciously plans to distort reality, and then goes on to accept that distortion as a "complete and exhaustive" account, is that of the computer scientist Herbert A. Simon, concerning his own fundamental theoretical orientation:

"  An ant, viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple.  The apparent complexity of it s behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which it finds itself ... the truth or falsity of [this] hypothesis should be independent of whether ants, viewed more microscopically  are simple or complex systems.  At the level of cells or molecules, ants are demonstrably complex; but these microscopic details of the inner environment may be largely irrelevant to the ant's behavior in relation to the outer environment.  That is why an automaton,  though completely different at the microscopic level, might nevertheless simulate the ant's gross behavior...
" I should like to explore this hypothesis,  but with the word 'man' substituted for 'ant'. 
" A man, viewed as a behaving system is quite simple.  The apparent complexity of his behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which he finds himself...  I myself believe that the hypothesis holds even for the whole man." 

With a single stroke of the pen, by simply substituting "man" for "ant," the presumed irrelevancy of the microscopic details of the ant's inner environment to its behavior has been elevated to the irrelevancy of the whole man's inner environment to his behavior!  Writing 23 years before Simon, but as if Simon's words were ringing in his ears, Huxley states;

"Because of the prestige of science as a source of power, and because of the general neglect of philosophy,  the popular Weltanschauung of our times contains a large element of what may be called 'nothing-but' thinking.  Human beings, it is more or less tacitly assumed, are nothing but bodies, animals, even machines ... values are nothing but illusions that have somehow got themselves mixed up in our experience of the world;  mental happenings are nothing but epiphenomena... spirituality is nothing but ... and so on."

Except, of course, that here we are not dealing with the "popular" Weltanschauung, but with that of one of the most prestigious of American scientists.  Nor is Simon's assumption of what is irrelevant to the whole man's behavior " more or less tacit"; to the contrary, he has, to his credit, made it quite explicit. 

Simon also provides us with an exceptionally clear and explicit description of how, and how thoroughly, the scientist prevents himself from crossing the boundary between the circle of light cast by his own presuppositions and the darkness beyond.  In discussing how he went about testing the theses that underlie his hypothesis, i.e. that man is quite simple, etc., he writes;

"I have surveyed some of the evidence from a range of human performances, particularly those that have been studied in the psychological laboratory.

The behavior of human subjects in solving cryptarithmetic problems, in attaining concepts, in memorizing, in holding information in short-term memory, in processing visual stimuli, and in performing tasks that use natural languages provides strong support for these theses... generalizations about human thinking... are emerging from the experimental evidence.  They are simple things, just as our hypothesis led us to expect.  Moreover, though the picture will continue to be enlarged and clarified,  we should not expect it to become essentially more complex.  Only human pride argues that the apparent intricacies of our path stem from quite different sources than the intricacy of the ant's path."

The hypothesis to be tested here is, in part, that the inner environment of the whole man is irrelevant to his behavior.  One might suppose that, in order to test it, evidence that might be able to falsify it would be sought.  One might, for example, study man's behavior in the face of grief or of a profound religious experience.  But these examples do not easily lend themselves to the methods for the study of human subjects developed in psychological laboratories.  Nor are they likely to lead to the simple things an experimenter's hypotheses lead him to expect.  They lie in the darkness in which the theorist, in fact, has lost his keys' but the light is so much better under the lamppost he himself has erected.

There is thus no chance whatever that Simon's hypothesis will be falsified by his or his colleagues' minds.  The circle of light that determines and delimits his range of vision simply does not illuminate any areas in which questions of, say, values or subjectivity can possibly arise.  Questions of that kind, being, as they must be, entirely outside his universe of discourse, can therefore not lead him out of his conceptual framework, which  like all other magical explanatory systems, has a ready reserve of possible hypotheses available to explain any conceivable event.

Almost the entire enterprise that is modern science and technology is afflicted with the drunkard's search syndrome and with the myopic vision which is its direct result.  But, as Huxley has pointed out, this myopia cannot sustain itself without being nourished by experiences of success.  Science and technology are sustained by their translations into power and control.  To the extent that computers and computation may be counted as part of science and technology, they feed at the same table.  The extreme phenomenon of the compulsive programmer teaches us that computers have the power to sustain megalomaniac fantasies.  But that power of the computer is merely an extreme version of a power that is inherent in all self-validating systems of thought.  Perhaps we are beginning to understand that the abstract systems - the games computer people can generate in their infinite freedom from the constraints that delimit the dreams of workers in the real world - may fail catastrophically when their rules are applied in earnest.  We must also learn that the same danger is inherent in other magical systems that are equally detached from authentic human experience, and particular in those sciences that insist they can capture the whole man in the abstract skeletal frameworks. 

"There will be no chance that Simon's hypothesis will be falsified by his or his colleagues' minds."   "Falsification" as the touchstone guaranteeing the presence of the quest of modern alchemy, "science," has been introduced into the popular imagination since Weizenbaum wrote what he did.   You can encounter sci-rangers who demonstrate their profound ignorance of what the word means flashing it like iron pyrite all over the web.  As this passage shows, the concept is little understood by even very sophisticated people, scientists included, perhaps especially.   They certainly will be unaware that even among scientists and the philosophers of science, "Falsifiability" isn't granted the status of a fixed and uncontroversial truth.

Much of the misconception of science, as encountered among the sciency, is encompassed in this passage.  You can read it and remember it was written during the dawn of Sociobiology, as expounded by E.O. Wilson, the world's foremost experts in ants and the reduction of people into "lumbering robots" by the "evolutionary" psychology that quickly succeeded it and overtook it.   In that form, as popularized in "The Selfish Gene" and other radically reductionist popularization, it has taken root among the would-be intelligentsia, both those in their own minds and those with advanced degrees.  It governs how they see other peoples' lives and, astonishingly enough, their own experience.

The TV commercial says, "If love is a chemical reaction,...." only in the minds of many, perhaps most, college educated folks these days, there is no if about it.   I would say if only they understood the practice of the radical abstraction and the profoundly limited focus of the psychological reductionist practice that is the origin of that superstition, they might not fall for it.  The chain of assumptions that leads to that belief contains many links that are ideological, I would guess even more of them than the "Intelligent Design" effort might.   Only, ideological links that are based in materialism are invisible to any but rather rigorous reviewers of science because the consideration of material entities is the subject matter of science.

In the 20th century and on to today, there has been an odd form of elevation of scientists, usually at the twilight of their productive career in science, to the status of popular sage or, more often, oracle.   These people declaim their prophesy on TV and YouTube to an eager lay public and to each other,  scientists are as prone to falling for PR as anyone.  Since the 1970s, these have been prophets of materialistic scientism,  just about any of the big name scientists whose names are recognized would fall into that category.   The editing of popular culture, done mostly by non-scientists who are quite ga-ga with the glamorous cache that science has or by wannabees who gave up long ago, disappears scientists who don't teach that dogma.   As real, working scientists forget that they are sampling a very limited amount of human experience to issue their doctrines and declaring their universal efficacy, the rest of us are prone to doing the same thing, adding ignorant credulity to the mix.

Saturday, June 5, 2021

This Is The End Of The Introduction To Computer Power and Human Reason - The Far Messier Commentary On What It Said Will Continue

The man in the street surely believes such scientific facts to be as well-established, as well-proven, as his own existence.  His certitude is an illusion.  Nor is the scientist himself immune to the same illusion.  In his praxis, he must, after all, suspend disbelief in order to do or think anything at all.  He is rather like a theatergoer, who, in order to participate in and understand what is happening on the stage, must for a time pretend to himself that he is witnessing real events.  The scientist must believe his working hypothesis, together with its vast underlying structure of theories and assumptions, even if only for the sake of the argument.  Often the "argument" extends over his entire lifetime.  Gradually he becomes what he at first merely pretended to be; a true believer.  I choose the word "argument" thoughtfully, for scientific demonstrations, even mathematical proofs, are fundamentally acts of persuasion.

Scientific statements can never be certain;  they can only be more or less credible.  And credibility is a term in individual psychology, i. e. a term that has meaning only with respect to an individual observer.  To say that some proposition is credible is, after all, to say that it is believed by an agent who is free not to believe it, that is by an observer who, after exercising judgment and (possibly) intuition, chooses to accept the proposition as worthy of his believing it.  How then can science, which itself surely and ultimately rests on vast arrays of human value judgments, demonstrate that human value judgments are illusory?  It cannot do so without forfeiting its own status as the single legitimate path to understanding man and his world.  

But no merely logical argument, no matter how cogent or eloquent can undo this reality;  that science has become the sole legitimate form of understanding in the common wisdom.  When I say that science has been gradually converted into a slow-acting poison,  I mean that the attribution of certainty to scientific knowledge by the common wisdom, an attribution now made so nearly universally that it has become a commonsense dogma, has virtually deligitimatized all other ways of understanding.  People viewed the arts, especially literature, as sources of intellectual nourishment and understanding, but today the ares are perceived largely as entertainments.  The ancient Greek and Oriental theaters, the Shakesperian stage, the stages peopled by the Ibsens and Chekhovs nearer to our day - these were schools.  The curricula they taught were vehicles for understanding the societies they represented.  Today, although an occasional Arthur Miller or Edward Albee survives and is permitted to teach on the New York or London stage, the people hunger only for what is represented to them to be scientifically validated knowledge.  They seek to satiate themselves at such scientific cafeterias as Psychology Today, or on popularized versions of the works of Masters and Johnson, or on Scientology as revealed by L. Ron Hubbard.  Belief in the rationality-logicality equation has corroded the prophetic power of language itself.  We can count but we are rapidly forgetting how to say what is worth counting and why
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This passage was a good part of why I first decided to go through the then, for me at least, novel exercise of typing large passages of books out to comment on what they said.  Then, in the period of the new-atheist fad of the now going on two decades past, even before I had concluded that the three mainstays of conventional atheist-materialist-scientism were deadly to my primary goal, the success of egalitarian democracy, hollowing out the foundations of it, I was already enormously annoyed by exactly this aspect of the common-received atheist faith and its popular expression in the semi-commercial "skepticism" movement.   More generally I was beginning to really understand that, far from supporting equality and a democratic system based on justice, the common received culture of the college-credentialed was more likely to produce white-collar Republicans who were prone to fascism in protection of their accumulated wealth under a morality that was a legalistic expression of an even more vulgar materialism, modern Mammonism.   And that that was as apt to be true of those on the secular left as it was the overt capitalist right and center - according to the conventional meaning of those terms.   Snobbery among the college-credentialed on the left played no small part in that, as well, secular leftism being more a lifestyle choice than an expression of a well-founded morality that supports an effective and full struggle to establish equal justice which could not be found in its required and hegemonic ideological foundations, in any way.   

While Joseph Weizenbaum may not have exactly expected my analysis of the crisis on the very different parts of the coalition that are what we call "the left" to come the way it does from his statement that "science has been converted into a slow-acting poison" due to that faith in its all enveloping potency and its sole legitimacy I think my analysis of it in regard to American politics, the politics in countries in which "the left" means everything from what remains of Marxism to a watered down secularist materialist modified 18th century style European laissez-faire liberalism under a degraded form of republicanism is correct.  

The extent to which "the left" has given up the faith that equality, that justice, that fairness are true BECAUSE THAT IS HOW GOD CREATED THE UNIVERSE, that the universe itself tends in that direction and that people have a moral obligation with consequences to bend their actions in that direction as well, is the extent to which "the left" will not only never succeed but will, as well, peter out into the kind of impotence that has characterized the left in the period after its high point in America, the weeks and months and all too brief years when the agitation led by The Reverend Martin Luther King jr. and others, most of whom were people of faith, led to lawmaking to pursue equal justice, economic justice in the mid-1960s.  The progress that was made after that was an after-glow and as that faded it became largely a matter of a few agenda items considered "leftist" or "liberal" largely out of a coincidental intersection where laissez-faire for the elites met up with a more general egalitarian program of justice.  I think that is what accounts for the fact that even as equal rights for Black People and other People of Color has been successfully attacked, especially in voting rights by the Republican-fascist right, much of the agenda for gay men and lesbians has succeeded.   The equal justice on the basis of things such as employment, marriage equality allowed for gay men and lesbians, even supported by one of the most potent enemies of the rights of Black People, of other People of Color, the enemy of the right to cast a vote and have it counted, Chief "Justice" John Roberts is certainly due to him wanting those things for "people like him" not because he has any devotion to the general equality of all people and universal justice.  He is, in fact, an interesting study in the intersections of those two generally opposing things, 18th century "liberalism" and the more general, egalitarian traditional American meaning of that word as so well and prophetically addressed by The Reverend Martin Luther King jr. throwing in Republican-fascist intent to dominate absolutely and anti-democratically into that mix.  

One of the themes I have developed was the enormous price that the American left has paid due to its championing the rights of and even some of the claims of those devotees to the ultimate expansion of the materialistic scientism and atheism of the past, the Marxists.   Marxism is an ultimate expression of that received faith which I have come to see is one of the most deadly poisons of a real left, one motivated by the pursuit of equality, equal justice in its real meaning - in which economic justice is the center - and one which, using the language of equality, of fairness, a fairness which has never existed during any of the Marxist regimes supported by the Marxist left, has duped even traditional American style liberals into being their patsies to the ever enduring damage to the real left.  It is no accident that anti-commie talk has reemerged now, even today when the most Marxist of countries, China, has an economy that Marx might recognize as his nightmare capitalism on steroids and the North Korean slave state contracts slave labor out to the Putin regime, which has given up the pretense of Marxism altogether, keeping the gangster-boss political and law structure which Lenin and Stalin cemented into place as "Communism" as soon as they took power.  If Trotsky had won his power struggle with Stalin, he'd have done the same probably with at least as much violence as Stalin did.  And all that time the American "left" supported that or at least discouraged the recognition of the Marxist left here for being the stooges and admirers of gangster strong-men that they were.  

I think there is no more of a quintessential example of that than the lore of the Hollywood 10 who were, to a person, either present day or past supporters of Stalin, well-paid by the movie industry to write and, um, "create" even as their hero kept a jack-boot on the arts, literature, murdering writers and poets and people in the theater and movie industry in ways well known in the United States.  Some of the figures in and around that, the people whose far more limited persecution we were to lament and rage over were open signatories in support of Stalin's show trials and summary executions, some of whom never allowed those to bother them at all as they lived in a continuing affluence afforded them as even under-cover scribblers for the American movie industry.   What they never were was a real danger to American democracy in line with their intentions, there was no way they were going to sucker most Americans into voting for Marxism through the entertainment industry.  Their real damage to democracy came from their associating themselves with the real left, the Democratic Party and so to its discrediting which the Republican-fascists are reviving even as they are the ones taking their instructions from and supporting the intentions of a former Communist gangster dictator in Russia.   The party that put his puppet into power and which keeps him as the Hollywood-TV invented leader of their party.  

If you don't think that is relevant to what Joseph Weizenbaum discusses in this introduction to his book Computer Power and Human reason, I will remind you he began with this:


In 1935 Michael Polanyi,  then holder of the Chair of Physical Chemistry at Victoria University of Manchester,  England, was suddenly shocked into a confrontation with philosophical questions that have ever since dominated his life.  The shock was administered by Nicolai Bukharin,  one of the leading theoreticians of the Russian Communist party,  who told Polanyi that "under socialism the conception of science pursued for its own sake would disappear, for the interests of scientists would spontaneously turn to the problems of the current Five Year Plan."  Polanyi sensed then that "the scientific outlook appeared to have produced a mechanical conception of man and history in which there was no place for science itself."  And further that "this conception denied altogether any intrinsic power of thought and thus denied any grounds for claiming freedom of thought."

Marxism was not the only strain of that thinking, it was and is widely held under any interpretation of the world under a materialistic, scientistic and almost all atheistic framings of reality.  It was as true for Nazism as it was Stalinism, it is as true for eliminative positivisim and evolutionary psychology even those parts of it which claim to use science to support its degrading of minds to being those of "lumbering robots" that exist for the benefit of DNA, their status as insignificant expressions of the movements and combinations of molecules controlled by nothing but the "laws of science" either unaware of or uninterested in the fact that those laws exist in no place except the minds they are degrading in the interest of their ideology.  That actually does comprise a good part of the metaphysics as taught by modern universities, it is the faith taught by them and supported by the culture of the college-credentialed who probably couldn't do second year algebra, never mind understand any of the alleged scientific basis of its claims.

Meanwhile, the real American left must keep on even as the secular left whines about its ennui and annoyance because the real left knows that they have an enduring moral obligation to try and struggle to produce equality in results, in real lives, in real life and not in impotent theory.  The real American left is a lot harder than the secular left or the even more degraded form of that, the play-left.  It is no wonder that the Democrats in nominal control of the American government have a hard time ruling even with the support of a majority of Americans for their intentions.  So much is stacked against them.  I have looked and I have seen the secular left is already doing what they do, slamming their inability to deliver promptly what they want to do.  They do that even as the person honored by the "Center For Inquiry" for her contribution to bringing atheism into politics, Krysten Sinema is one of the roadblocks to doing that.  At least people are calling her a "conservative Democrat" as she does it.  Before she became a Senator a lot of people were calling her a liberal because of her sexual orientation.  Which may tie up another of the threads in this post. 

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I am tempted to go over more of Joseph Weizenbaum's book, skipping the chapter in which he creates a game to try to explain how a computer works.  If you want to read his book, which I would encourage because there is a lot more than just this to it, I would encourage you to read the chapter which opposes the practice of instrumental reasoning.  Though all of it is very important to understanding why this is a danger to the struggle for equality, equal justice, economic justice, and democracy.  It is probably as important to understanding how "scientific materialism" as politically expressed in Marxism is as fundamentally opposed to even the weak, half-measure towards achieving that equality, electoral democracy as other, more overtly anti-egalitarian ideologies claiming to, as well be expressions of "applied science" as laissez-faire capitalism and Nazism are.  As are, in a strictly American context, the various Republican-fascist ideologies that enshrine the Constitution, giving it a similar status as "science" takes in other ideologies.  The Constitution, written largely by those who were proponents of 18th century scientistic hegemony, the "enlightenment" carries in it not a slight amount of that poison, though its motives were purely those of slave-holders and bankers and mercantile economic interests.  They found nothing in their materialism or scientism to counter their self-interests.  

The brief expression of something higher at the beginning of the Declaration of Independence, suppressed by their "enlightened self-interest" away from the declaration of God endowing all people with inalienable rights.   Jefferson as willing as Madison or any of the others to turn his back on that as it profited him.  I think it was, for him, a logical problem of explaining the rights of white men and their source which can only come from The Creator - he could not account for them with science or materialistic philosophy - while never intending to extend those to all.  There is no way the documents and governmental structures set up by such people would not include opportunities for those to legally prevent equal justice as has, in fact, comprised so much of the history of the Constitution, the Supreme Court and, as is most often seen, the anti-democratically constituted Senate.   I am convinced more and more, the more I look into these things that either you believe that God created all people as equal and in God's image or you are looking out for #1.